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CASES NOTED
unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. "The differences between the interests of property
owners and the interests of nonproperty owners are not sufficiently sub-
stantial to justify excluding the latter from the franchise."2
Though real property owners may have a somewhat different inter-
est than that of nonproperty owners in the issuance of general obligation
bonds,29 the existence of this difference is no basis for assuming that non-
property owners will not be substantially affected by the outcome of the
election. Nonproperty owners will in effect also be paying a portion of
the taxes to finance the general obligation bonds through higher rents and
prices for goods and services.80
In the author's opinion, the effect of the instant case will be to
eliminate property ownership limitations on the right to exercise the
voting franchise. The question posed in Kramer and Cipriano appears to
be resolved. Limiting the franchise to those primarily interested is not a
compelling interest because "when all citizens are affected in impor-
tant ways by a governmental decision . . . the Constitution does not
permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens
from the franchise."'" The United States Supreme Court has yet to allude
to a situation in which limiting the voting franchise to a certain class
of voters might further a compelling state interest. Furthermore, when
applying the stricter "valid state interest" test to determine the constitu-
tionality of voter qualifications, most classifications will inevitably fall
since the excluded class of voters can usually show an interest in any
election and that they will be affected to some degree by the outcome.
SUSAN GOLDMAN
RESIGN TO RUN: A QUALIFICATION FOR
STATE OFFICE OR A NEW
THEORY OF ABANDONMENT?
The plaintiff, a Florida Circuit Judge whose term did not expire for
three years, intended to run for the office of Justice of the Florida Su-
preme Court. He was informed by the Florida Secretary of State, that
28. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
29. General obligation bonds may be described as a lien on property within the munic-
ipality since the issuers must levy sufficient taxes to service the bonds.
30. Several reasons were set out by the Court to show how non-property holders are
affected by the outcome of general obligation bond elections:
a. All residents of Phoenix are affected by this election since it is to finance public
facilities;
b. Although property taxes are initially paid by property owners, this expense is
passed on to tenants in higher rents and prices; and
c. Although Arizona law calls for property taxes to service general obligation bonds,
other revenues are legally available and will probably be used.
31. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,209 (1970).
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unless he submitted an irrevocable resignation from his office of Circuit
Judge, ten days before the date of qualifying, the Secretary would reject
his qualification papers for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff, however, wished to retain his present office in the event that
his quest for a seat on the Florida high court should be unsuccessful. He
therefore brought a suit for declaratory judgment, contending that the
Florida "resign-to-run" law' was unconstitutional in that it imposed an
additional qualification upon a constitutionally created office. The trial
court found section 99.012(2), (3), & (4) of the 1970 Florida Statutes
to be constitutional. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida, held,
affirmed: The statute does not relate to the qualifications one must pos-
sess in order to hold office, but merely the conditions under which a per-
son may become eligible to become a candidate. Holley v. Adams, 238
So.2d 401 (Fla. 1970).
As early as 1934, the Supreme Court of Florida proclaimed that
when the state constitution creates an office and names the requirements
of eligibility therefor, the legislature has no authority to create additional
qualifications for that office.2 The legislature may establish and modify
qualifications for only those offices which it has the power to create.3
Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Davies not only laid down
the general rule for Florida but also provided its first exception. The
Florida Constitution4 had created the office of County Surveyor without
prescribing any qualifications and therefore the legislature could enact a
statute5 which required the registration of all surveyors as a police power
1. (2) No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office who holds another
elective or appointive office, whether state, county or municipal, the term of which
or any part thereof runs concurrent with the term of office for which he seeks to
qualify without resigning from such office not less than ten (10) days prior to the
first day of qualifying for the office he intends to seek. Said resignation shall be
effective not later than the date upon which he would assume office, if elected
to the office to which he seeks to qualify, or the expiration date of the term of the
office which he presently holds, or the general election day at which his successor is
elected, whichever occurs earliest. With regard to elective offices said resignation
shall create a vacancy in said office thereby permitting persons to qualify as
candidates for nomination and election to that office, in the same manner as if the
term of such public officer were otherwise scheduled to expire; or, in regard to
elective municipal or home rule charter county offices, said resignation shall create
a vacancy which may be filled for the unexpired term of the resigned officer in
such manner as provided in the municipal or county charter. This does not apply to
political party offices.
(3) Any incumbent public officer whose term of office or any part thereof runs
concurrent to the term of office for which he seeks to qualify and who desires to
resign his office pursuant to the provisions of this section shall execute an instru-
ment in writing directed to the governor irrevocably resigning from the office he
currently occupies. The resignation shall be presented to the governor with a copy
to the department of state. The resignation shall become effective and shall have the
effect of creating a vacancy in office as provided herein, and the public officer
shall continue to serve until his successor is elected or the vacancy otherwise filled as
provided in subsection (2).
(4) Nothing contained in subsections (2) and (3) shall relate to persons hold-
ing any federal office.
FLA. STAT. § 99.012(2), (3), (4) (Supp. 1970).
2. State v. Ward, 117 Fla. 585, 158 So. 273 (1934).
3. Id. at 586, 158 So. at 274.
4. FnA. CONST. art. 18, § 10 (1885).
5. Fla. Laws 1931, ch. 15657.
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measure designed to regulate a public profession. In State v. Ward,6 the
statute was held to be a reasonable exercise of the legislature's power
over public professions because it established
certain reasonable standards of professional fitness for those
persons otherwise qualified who aspire to hold particular offices
implying some additional qualification in the nature of a profes-
sional or technical fitness or training to be possessed by the of-
fice holder .... I
Eighteen years after Ward, the Supreme Court of Florida was again
called upon to decide the power of the legislature to impose additional
qualifications upon a constitutional office.' The legislature had enacted a
school code,9 part of which required candidates for the office of Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction to hold a valid Florida Graduate Teacher's
Certificate.10 However, the constitution never mentioned any such re-
quirement or qualification for the office."' The court agreed that it might
be desirable to have certain educational, physical, mental, and moral
qualifications definitely prescribed for the office of County Superinten-
dent of Public Instruction, and conceeded that such qualifications would
very likely improve the efficiency of the educational system. However, the
court noted that the County Superintendent of Public Instruction is not
merely an employee, but that he is a constitutional officer and, if the qual-
ifications for this office prescribed by the legislature conflict with those
prescribed by the state constitution, the statute prescribing those qualifi-
cations must be declared invalid.'2 The constitution prescribes in no un-
certain terms that certain persons are disqualified to hold certain con-
stitutional offices, such as, Governor,18 Members of the Legislature, 4
Justices of the Supreme Court and Judges of the Circuit and Criminal
Courts. 5 The constitution further excludes from the offices it creates all
persons convicted of certain high crimes and misdemeanors.' 6 According
to the court, these enumerated qualifications were to be taken as exclu-
sive of all other criteria, whether in the affirmative or negative.
These plain and unambiguous specifications of disabilities ex-
clude all others unless the Constitution provides otherwise. The
effect of this declaration in the Constitution that certain offices
are not qualified carries with it the necessary implication that
all others are qualified.' 7
6. 117 Fla. 585, 158 So. 273 (1934).
7. State v. Ward, 117 Fla. 585, 586, 158 So. 273, 274 (1934) (emphasis added).
8. Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1952).
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 230.25, 231.17, 231.20, 231.24 (1951).
10. FLA. STAT. § 230.25 (1951).
11. FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 6 (1885).
12. Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 173, 175 (Fla. 1952).
13. FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 3 (1885).
14. FLA. CONST. art. 3, §§ 4, 7, 8 (1885).
15. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3 (1885).
16. FLA. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (1885).
17. Thomas v. State, 58 So.2d 173, 185 (Fla. 1952).
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When questioned as to the eligibility of an incumbent governor to
run for re-election under rather dubious circumstances, the court in Er-
vin v. Collins,'8 reasoned that doubt or ambiguity as to eligibility for of-
fice should be resolved in favor of the peoples' right to choose their
elected officials.
The lexicon of democracy condemns all attempts to restrict
ones right to run for office.... Florida is committed to the gen-
eral rule in this country that the right to hold office is a valuable
one and should not be abridged except for unusual reason or by
plain provision of law. 9
This commitment was found to be somewhat less than absolute when it
was applied in Jones v. Board of Control,20 wherein the court sustained
the validity of a Board of Control rule which required its employees to
resign before running for office. Jones held that the right to seek public
office is not a constitutional absolute, but a privilege subject to reason-
able restraints and reasonable conditions.
In State v. Adams," the court was presented with an incumbent
office-holder seeking to qualify for two different offices in an upcoming
primary election. After first deciding that there were no statutory or con-
stitutional bars to an incumbent becoming a candidate for another office,
even if the terms were inconsistent, the court held that multiple candi-
dacies were contrary to a sound public policy and therefore subject to
reasonable restrictions in the public interest.22
In a per curiam decision, the court in Maloney v. Kirk28 held that a
statute24 which authorized the making of a decree voiding a gubernatorial
election for failure to comply with statutory regulations 25 regarding cam-
paign contributions and election expenses was an unconstitutional at-
tempt to add to the qualifications prescribed by the constitution 21 for can-
didates for the office of Governor. Justice Roberts, concurring specially,
argued that the legislature could not by indirection do what it was pro-
hibited from doing directly.27 The statute "in effect disqualifies the can-
didate from holding the office notwithstanding the election.
'128
18. 85 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1956).
19. Id. at 858.
20. 131 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1961).
21. 139 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1962).
22. Subsequent to this decision the Florida Legislature enacted FLA. STAT. § 99.012
(1969) subsection one of which reads as follows:
(1) No individual may qualify as a candidate for public office whose name
appears on the same or another ballot for another office, whether federal, state,
county or municipal, the term of which or any part thereof runs concurrent to the
office for which he seeks to qualify. This, however, does not apply to political party
offices.
23. 212 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
24. FLA. STAT. § 104.27 (1967).
25. FLA. STAT. § 99.161 (1967).
26. FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 3 (1885).




In a recent opinion29 the Florida Supreme Court invalidated a stat-
ute8 ° setting up a six month residence requirement for the constitutional8'
office of County Commissioner. The statute was held invalid because it
prescribed qualifications for the office in addition to those prescribed by
the Constitution. The court made it clear that it was following the settled
law of Thomas v. States2 and Maloney v. Kirk.s8
The decision reached in the case sub judice represents not so much
a retreat from established constitutional interpretation as an escape from
literal interpretation into the dimension of reasonability. Faced by con-
flicting decisions in other jurisdictions construing similar statutes," the
Florida Supreme Court was forced to rely on its own reasoning and a
handful of previous decisions. The pattern traced by these earlier deci-
sions is extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, the tradition of the
Florida Supreme Court has been one of summarily invalidating any
legislation which might create, modify or remove qualifications for con-
stitutional offices. On the other hand is the growing propensity of the
same court to sustain police power measures which can be shown to be
reasonably necessary to correct troublesome or potentially troublesome
situations.
The Holley court was forced to apply these apparently conflicting
precedents to an act with the stated legislative intent of modifying, in
some measure, the qualifications for becoming a candidate for a constitu-
tional office.85 Evidently the court perceived a duty to sustain the act if at
all possible. 6 The apparent semantic shuffling of the court in seeking a
basis for sustaining the act probably resulted from the attempted perfor-
mance of this duty.
After first defining "eligible" as being "capable of being chosen"
and "qualified" as being "the performance of the acts which the person
chosen is required to perform before he can enter into the office," the
court decided that Florida Statute section 99.012 did not prescribe addi-
tional qualifications for office, but merely regulated the conditions under
which one might become eligible.17
The importance of the decision in Holley lies not so much in the
avoidance of the constitutional issue as in the advancement of the propo-
29. Wilson v. Newell, 223 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1969).
30. FLA. STAT. § 99.032 (1967).
31. FLA. CONST. art. 8, § 5 (1885).
32. 58 So.2d 173 (Fla. 1952).
33. 212 So.2d 609 (Fla. 1968).
34. Mulholland v. Ayers, 109 Mont. 558, 99 P.2d 234 (1940); Burroughs v. Lyles, 142
Tex. 704, 181 S.W.2d 570 (1944).
35. WHEREAS, it is generally agreed to be considered inequitable to permit an
elected official or appointive official holding office to use the prestige and power of
that office in seeking election to a higher or different office, and
WHEREAS, it is generally agreed that by providing for prospective resignations
the people of the State of Florida would not be compelled to bear unnecessary cost
of special elections occasioned by elected or appointed officials who, while holding
one office, seek and obtain another elective office.
FLA. STAT. § 99.012 (Supp. 1970).
36. Holley at 405, citing Amos v. Matthews, 99 Fla. 1, 126 So. 308 (1930).
37. Holley supra, at 406.
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sition that the right to hold office as well as the right to seek office was
subject to reasonable restraints. Prior to the enactment of section 99.012,
Judge Holley would have been required to resign his present office only
when he accepted and entered upon the duties of his new office. 8 The
court decided that section 99.012 operates as an extension of the rule of
abandonment of office by those who become a candidate for another
office. Moreover, in the court's opinion,
there is no constitutional provision prohibiting the Legislature
from declaring that the mere filing for a second office by the
holder of one office under the circumstances covered by [section
99.012] operates as an abandonment of the first. 9
In the opinion of this writer, the decision reached in the instant case
merely represents an attempt to make the best of a bad situation. The
Florida high court studiously avoided addressing itself to the constitu-
tional implications of the amendments to Florida Statute section 99.012
spending precious little time exploring the very real differences between
eligibility for office and qualifications required for office. However, it did
at least advance a plausible theory of voluntary abandonment of office,
sufficiently well reasoned to allow the court to sustain a badly needed po-
lice power measure.
While there can be little doubt that this ruling will bring order to a
confused electoral scene, one must also consider the possible dangers of
allowing the legislature the power to tamper with the people's right of
free access to constitutional offices. It appears that only Chief Justice
Ervine was disturbed by this prospect as evidenced by his extremely co-
gent dissent.
Lastly, although the instant decision concerned only state officers
seeking other state offices, and although section 99.012 states specifically
that it does not apply to persons holding federal office, in light of the
abandonment theory adopted by the courts, the decision in Holley would
have been more enlightening if it had adequately explored the dimension
of state office-holders seeking federal office. The act would be transpar-
ently unconstitutional if it were applicable to present federal office-
holders. In the opinion of this writer its application to any prospective
federal officer presents the same issues and should result in a finding of
invalidity.4"
THOMAS A. HENDRICKS
38. State v. Adams, 139 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1962).
39. Holley at 407, citing Mulholland v. Ayers, 109 Mont. 558, 99 P.2d 234 (1940).
40. In a companion case, State v. Adams, 238 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1970), the Florida
Supreme Court sustained the provisions of § 99.012 as applied to a state officeholder seek-
ing federal office. Subsequently, however, a three-judge federal district court in Stack v.
Adams, 315 F. Supp. 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1970), held that § 99.012 did in fact prescribe an ad-
ditional qualification for office when applied to those seeking a seat in the United States
House of Representatives. In the face of this conflict the Supreme Court of Florida granted
realtor Davis' petition for rehearing of State v. Adams, supra, and stayed its decision pend-
ing review by the United States Supreme Court.
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